Our context involves N Cournot oligopolists producing M products at constant marginal costs when preferences are quasilinear. We identify relationships between second moments of unit costs and second moments of firm-level production. For example, a larger variance in unit costs of a product increases own output variance and the variance of any other output. We also investigate how second moments of unit costs affect industry cost efficiency. 
Introduction
Curiosities abound concerning the comparative statics of cost for the standard Cournot model in which a single homogeneous good is produced at a constant firm-specific unit cost. Seade (1985) , for example, has shown that Cournot oligopolists can gain from an excise tax whereas competitive firms and monopolists cannot. Among these curiosities, our interest concerns two. One is that, as observed by Bergstrom and Varian (1985) , a sum-preserving increase in the variance of these unit costs decreases industry costs if the set of active firms does not change. This observation has generated a growing body of research regarding what are referred to as cost manipulation games, see Salant and Shaffer (1999) and Van Long and Soubeyran (1997 , 2001 , 2005 . The second curiosity, initially identified by Lahiri and Ono (1988) , is that assistance to a small firm can reduce social welfare. This is because smaller active firms are socially inefficient since the largest firm (if it does indeed have unlimited capacity to produce at its given unit cost) should produce all that is consumed under social efficiency. Février and Linnemer (2004) have generalized the observation to quite arbitrary cost shocks while Zhao (2001) and Wang and Zhao (2007) have provided explicit conditions in particular cases.
These two peculiarities are, of course, related. When the unit cost of a high cost firm increases, then mean unit cost increases and the variance of unit costs increases. The effect on mean unit cost should reduce welfare, but that on variance should increase welfare. If the firm is small enough, then the latter dominates since more efficient firms pick up some of the smaller firm's decline in output and the efficiency gap is large enough. With two exceptions, those of Lapan and Hennessy (2006) and Wang and Zhao (2007) , the literature to date has not extended the analysis to the case of multi-product oligopoly. Lapan and Hennessy study the implications of cost correlation structures for welfare in two-and three-product Cournot oligopoly. Wang and Zhao (2007) consider the case of product differentiation in the (linear) Bertrand-Shubik model.
The general intent of the present work is to look at how the moments of unit costs affect equilibrium in multi-product Cournot oligopoly, subject to the standard assumption that income effects and other consumer-side heterogeneities do not matter. Our first set of results, given in Section 2, establishes relationships between unit cost moments and output moments. A sample inference is what one might call a law of own variance equilibrium response: the variance of any output across firms must increase with the unit cost variance for that output. This is true regardless of how the output interacts in demand with other goods. A less intuitive result is that the variance in output for good A must increase with the variance of unit costs for good B.
Similarly, the covariance between two outputs must increase with the unit cost covariance between those two outputs.
The effects of cost moments on social welfare are considered in sections 3 and 4. It is found that an increase in a cost covariance increases (decreases) the sum of firm profits while leaving consumer surplus unaffected whenever goods complement (substitute). Concerning how an increase in mean unit costs might change welfare, the case of quadratic preferences is studied.
Then the introduction of plural markets does not affects Zhao's (2001) criteria for when an increase in the unit cost of a small firm increases industry profits and when it increases social welfare. Social welfare increases with an increase in some firm's unit cost of production in a given market whenever the firm's output share in that market is smaller than , where is the number of multi-market firms. The paper concludes with a brief review.
Model
The model involves M markets and firms, where each firm is active in all markets.
2 See Chapter 3 in Vives (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of this preference structure. It is assumed in the standard one-market oligopoly model, so that income effects do not enter as a consideration when specifying aggregate demand. 3 Rather than intersperse usage of both and , we intend to use in the main. We will use when price needs to be emphasized in conveying a point.
Since complementarity and substitution interactions on the demand side are important when seeking to understand equilibrium in our model, some words of caution are warranted. Function conveys how the inverse demand for the ith good changes as ( ) 5 See footnote 2 above. With income effects, then B is not symmetric. This would weaken somewhat some of our results. 6 We note in passing that a firm may be viewed as producing at under marginal cost if when evaluated at an equilibrium. This is more likely when goods complement in the sense of , and is high. Of course, price cannot be less than marginal cost for all goods since this would mean negative profits in our model.
7 Chapter 3 in Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1990) provides conditions under which a unique pure-strategy solution exists. Uniqueness is the more problematic of the two concerns. Szidarovszky and Li (2000) identify conditions under which local stability is guaranteed when
, and the covariance of outputs for goods i and j across firms as Cov 
where kt η is the Hicksian (and Marshallian) elasticity of demand.
The proposition's contents are best illustrated through identifying some implications.
Corollary 1.1. Under the assumptions in Proposition 1, (a)
Part ( (e) has an analog in dual demand theory in that it identifies some of the behavioral symmetries that demand system integrability requires. 
This is because the outputs in question differ from the unit costs in question. Firms with high (low) mth and sth unit costs tend to have high (low) ith and jth outputs. Each of the output responses will be in the same direction, but the response we are considering is the covariation between the ith and jth outputs. An increase in covariance between the mth and sth unit costs will act to better align the responses of the ith and jth outputs across firms and so will strengthen the covariation between the ith and jth outputs. 8 An example of an industry where firms with large market shares are involved in plural markets such that substitution in demand is almost certain is meat packing in the United States (Moschini, Moro, and Green, 1994) and elsewhere. 9 A vector of random variables is said to have the association property if, for any pair of increasing functions and , C holds. Clearly, this implies uniformly positive pair-wise correlation, which is all we require. Affiliation, a standard assumption in auction theory, is implied by association. See Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) on association.
So a system-wide positive covariance among unit costs implies a system-wide positive output covariance whenever demand also exhibits system-wide complementarity. But cost association is insufficient to sign Cov x ij when goods substitute in demand because own-price effects confound matters.
Welfare
Turning to industry profit effects, mean firm profit is * * , * * * * 1 1 1 ( ) ; ( , ... , ) .
In deviations form, use covariance relation From (a) it is seen that an increase in any unit cost variance increases profits regardless of the number of goods. So the standard result in Bergstrom and Varian (1985) and Salant and Shaffer 9 (1999) continues to apply in our multi-product setting. As for covariance effects, when the sums of unit costs remain fixed and outputs remain interior then consumer surplus is invariant to the change in covariance. Lower industry costs, therefore, imply that overall welfare increases Since summed unit costs will be the same regardless of which firms' costs are reduced, provided all firms remain active, the equilibrium price and aggregate output will not be affected by which firms adopt the innovation. In the case of a single product it was shown in earlier work (e.g., Bergstrom and Varian, 1985) that, given unit cost sums, any increase in the variance of the cost vector will result in (i) lower industry production costs and (ii) higher variance of firm outputs. Thus, the industry cost reduction will be maximized if the most efficient firm experiences the unit cost reduction, and this will also lead to the largest variance in firm outputs.
We inquire into whether similar results hold in the multi-product model. To understand what happens in either of situations (i) and (ii), consider Case II. Even though more of good 1 is produced by the lower cost producer, the changes in other outputs across firms cause more of those goods to be produced by the higher cost producer.
Turning to the covariance difference in (3.5), when comparing output variances we can write:
Thus, for the special rearrangement of a cost reduction that was considered here, the difference in output variance can be related to the difference in output costs. When then this is the efficiency result in Bergstrom and Varian (1985) , albeit for multi-product oligopoly.
Welfare under higher costs and quadratic preference structure
Even within the single market setting, special demand functions, such as linear demand, are widely used when seeking to understand how cost shocks might affect welfare (Vives, 1999; Grossman, 2007; Wang and Zhao, 2007) . In this section we will look at what can be said about welfare if one is willing to accept additional structure. We have not to this point imposed specific structure on . We didn't have to because interior solutions in the presence of constant unit costs ensured constant aggregate outputs. Now we seek to understand consequences of shifts in mean unit costs so that, inevitably, aggregate outputs will change.
( ) U X
In order to obtain some further insights when firms have heterogeneous costs, we will henceforth restrict attention to the quadratic preference structure: 
This proposition extends findings in Zhao (2001) to the multi-product setting. Interestingly, the share bounds he identified for a single good oligopoly are as in parts (c) and (d) above; i.e., interactions in demand do not affect these share bounds. The key insight is that an adverse cost shock to a large share firm is worse for industry profits than an adverse cost shock to a small share firm if the set of active firms remains the same after the shock. The general intuition has been developed extensively in earlier work for a single output market, see Février and Linnemer (2004) and papers referenced therein. We have shown that, for quadratic preferences at least, Zhao's specific bounds extend to multi-product oligopoly. 
Conclusion
We have extended the literature on relationships between the distributions of unit costs, unit cost innovations, equilibrium actions and welfare measures in multi-product Cournot oligopoly.
It is not surprising that the nature of interactions in preferences between consumed goods is prominent in these relationships. Sometimes though, such as when a unit cost increase improves welfare given quadratic utility, the nature of interactions is of little consequence. For the effect on equilibrium industry profits, differentiate (B2) while using (B6) and ( 
